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RELUCTANT SOLDIERS: THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
TRUXTUN HAREt
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged
(or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for
you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the
common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dyingfor your country if
you like.
Oliver Wendell Holmes'
INTRODUCTION
This century has witnessed the increasing use of federal statutes
to impose criminal liability on corporate officers as a means of regu-
lating corporate conduct that could result in harm to public health,
safety and welfare. 2 Some of these statutes require no scienter or
mens rea element, thereby subjecting corporate officials to Strict lia-
bility for actions or omissions in which they had a legaliy defined
"responsible share" 3 yet no direct participation or knowledge.4
t B.A. 1961, Yale University; M.A. 1972, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate
1990, University of Pennsylvania.
I 1 HOLMES-LASKi LETrERS 806 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
2 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 15-16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614-15 (1988)
(imposing civil and criminal liability on any person failing to comply with federal
regulations regarding interstate commerce of toxic chemical substances);
Wholesome Meat Inspection Act § 406, 21 U.S.C. § 676 (1982) (imposing criminal
liability on "any person, firm, or corporation" for violation of the Act, which
regulates the production and distribution of meats)); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 31-33, 21 U.S.C. 99 331-33 (1982) (imposing criminal sanctions for violation of
the Act, which regulates the interstate commerce of foods, drugs and cosmetics); Oil
Pollution Act § 6, 33 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982) (imposing criminal and civil penalties for
wilfully discharging oil or oily mixture from a ship). For a past estimate of the-pace
of the federal government's increasing reliance on the "deterrent effect of criminal
punishment to shape corporate action," see Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1229 & n.5 (1979).
3 See infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text. The issue of who is or is not a
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Under this "responsible share doctrine," a trier of fact may find a
corporate officer culpable if it determines that the officer, by reason
of his status and position of responsibility in the corporation, had a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
statute outlaws, regardless of his lack of awareness of the occur-
rence.5 Such an apparent abandonment of any mens rea standard
raises disturbing questions when these officers are incarcerated with-
out reference to whether or not they possessed culpable states of
minds .
6
"responsible" officer is central to this Comment in that the concept defines
substantially the scope of the officer's liability. The Supreme Court has determined
that the question of who falls within the scope of "responsible share" is a question to
be decided by the trier of fact. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 243-59.
4 See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. a. 673-74 (upholding a district court's criminal
conviction of the president of a national food market chain under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act for food contaminated by rodent excreta, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no proof of his knowledge of the contamination, because of the president's
responsibility and authority either to prevent or to correct the violation). For two
contrasting views of the scope of strict liability for responsible corporate officials
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, compare Abrams, Criminal Liability
of Corporate Officers for Strict Liabilit) Offenses-A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28
UCLA L. REV. 463,470-76 (1981) (arguing that the Court's standard of liability is not
really "strict," but rather contains an implicit culpable mental state contingent either
on a departure from a standard of care or upon a presence of a certain measure of
actual control over the situation) with Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for
Strict Liability Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1343-46 (1982)
(supporting a pure strict liability interpretation of Park's "responsible share"
standard, requiring no culpable state of mind for corporate officers but rather
focusing on the incorporation of ihe requirement of an act or omission in concert
with the element of causation).
5 See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85. For a discussion as to whether the mere
"status" of the corporate officer, regardless of his knowledge, is sufficient for
culpability to attach, see infra notes 134-37, 260-61 and accompanying text. There is
clearly disharmony between Dotterweich and Park on this issue. The coinage of the
phrase "responsible share," however, belongs entirely to Dotterweich. Id. at 284.
6 See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 348 (2d ed. 1960)
(noting that because strict liability violates the principles of any rational system of
criminal law, "[w]hat then remains but the myth that through devious, unknown ways
some good results from strict liability in 'penal' law?"); Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107, 150-51 (1962) ("No one should be sentenced
to imprisonment or its equivalent without being afforded the opportunity to litigate
the issue of mens rea or, to use the term adopted by the framers of the Model Penal
Code, culpability."); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933)
("To inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely innocent, who
caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the
feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement."). But see Brickey, supra
note 4, at 1378-81 (supporting the Court's strict liability standard in the absence of a
culpable state of mind in the context of the public welfare offense model);
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In contrast to these strict liability acts, other statutes provide for
criminal sanctions only when there has been a knowing violation,
thereby substantially increasing the prosecution's burden of proof.7
Resting between these two extremes is the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 19728 ("Clean Water Act").9 It crimi-
nally sanctions, by a maximum of one year's imprisonment, "any per-
son"10 who negligently discharges a pollutant from a point source
into navigable waters:
Any person who-(c)(1)(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title...
shall be punishable by a fine of no less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or by both
(c)(6) For the purpose of this subsection, the term "person"
means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of
this title, any responsible corporate officer. " I
This Comment examines three pivotal public policy issues con-
cerning the use of a negligence standard to criminally sanction cor-
porate officers (as opposed to sanctioning the corporate entity) in
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 744 (1960)
(maintaining that, in reality, strict liability offenses are predetermined by the
legislature to be per se unreasonable).
7 See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (holding that a municipal
ordinance could not be enforced against someone who was reasonably unaware of its
provisions); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982)
(making it a crime for any person knowingly to transport hazardous waste to a facility
without a permit); Packer, supra note 6, at 109 (asserting that the probable rationale
behind Congress creating, and the courts accepting, strict liability criminal statutes
may lie in the theory that "the conventional mens rea notion, that the actor must be
consciously aware of the factors making his conduct criminal, places so heavy a
burden on law enforcement that it is bound to be resisted").
8 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1982) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1987)). In 1987, Congress overrode a presidential veto
and enacted major changes to this legislation. See 133 CONG. REc. H525-26 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S 1708 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987). The Clean Water Act
has its origins in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Ch. 758, 62 Stat.
1155 (1948). See infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text for an analysis of changes
to the criminal enforcement section of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987), as they apply to
negligent violations.
9 This Comment refers to the amended legislation generally as the Clean Water
Act, but to the 1972 Amendments specifically as the 1972 Amendments.
10 The term "person" specifically includes any "responsible corporate officer."
33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
11 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(1), (6) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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order to regulate corporate conduct.1 2 First, is it efficacious or just1
3
to imprison corporate officers for industrial accidents 4 that may be
ascribed to negligent decision-making and conduct?'" In balancing
the potential sanctions imposed on the corporate entity itself against
potential sanctions imposed on the officers who manage its affairs, is
it more efficacious to punish the corporate entity, the individuals
who manage that entity, or both?' 6 Second, what degree of negli-
gence is required for criminal culpability to attach? Is it the mere
negligence standard of tort law,' 7 or does liability only attach when
conduct falls somewhere further along the continuum towards the
"gross negligence" of criminal common law?'" Third, in a negli-
gence context, how broad is the sweep of the term "responsible" in
the phrase "responsible corporate officer"?' 9 To what extent does it
impose vicarious liability?20 Specifically, how does the marrying of
the terms "negligence" and "responsible" affect the defendant's cul-
pability under the Clean Water Act's negligence standard? Does a
"responsible corporate officer" have a higher duty of care and there-
12 See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text for an analysis of the deterrent
efficacy of criminally sanctioning the corporation in lieu of its officers.
13 See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 6, at 135-41 (arguing that criminal penalties for
inadvertent harms, without requiring mens rea, is unjust); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAw: THE GENERAL PART 98-100 (1953) (arguing that the criminal negligence
standard lacks the necessary requirement ofmens rea, and consequently that the use of
the criminal negligence sanction for harms caused inadvertently is likely to be both
inefficacious and unjust). But see Packer, supra note 6, at 109-10, 143-45. Packer
argues that, on certain occasions, a criminal negligence standard can be a "half-way
house" that tentatively extends the concept of mens rea with some deterrent efficacy.
Packer further asserts that even though the standard ignores the actor's actual state
of mind, the actor is punished for deviating unjustifiably from a generally accepted
standard of conduct, thus the punishment has a "corrective function of promoting
future awareness." Id. at 144.
14 The word, "accidents," is to be construed as connoting inadvertent events,
not the "unavoidable" events to which Holmes' utilitarian theory of criminal
sanctions speaks. See 0. HOLMES, rHE COMMON LAw 48 (1881).
15 For a discussion of the view that sufficient vigilance, foresight, cost-benefit
analyses and the expenditure of monies can reduce the incidence of the accidental
pollution of the environment, see infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text for discussion of the relative
efficacy of sanctioning corporate officers versus sanctioning the corporate entity.
17 See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text for an analysis of the mere
negligence standard in relationship to the Clean Water Act.
18 See infra notes 173-99 and accompanying text for an analysis of common law
negligence standards and the Model Penal Code's proposed criminal negligence
standard which requires a "gross deviation."
19 See infra notes 246-64 for an analysis of cases developing the "responsible
share" doctrine.
20 See infra note 59 and accompanying text for an analysis of the vicarious
liability issue in the context of a negligence standard for corporate officers.
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fore a lower threshold for negligent culpability than would an ordi-
nary "person" under the statute?
2 1
The undefined reach of the Clean Water Act can be well illus-
trated by applying its framework to the recent oil spill by Exxon off
the coast of Alaska.22 In this spill, a pollutant was negligently dis-
charged from a "point source" into the "navigable waters," as those
words are defined by the Act. 23 But who may be deemed a "respon-
sible corporate officer" such as would make him criminally liable
under the Act? Those who continued to employ the captain while
knowing of his history with alcohol? Or is such "knowledge" even a
factor in determining "responsibility"? In a very large corporation
such as Exxon, may the Chief Executive Officer himself be held crim-
inally responsible despite his lack of any direct knowledge or direct
supervisory responsibility? 24 This Comment seeks to address these
questions.
Fulfilling the Clean Water Act's goal of "restor[ing] and main-
tain[ing the] chemical, physical and biological integrity of our
Nation's waters" 25 clearly would achieve a vital "common good."
From all sectors, concern has been rising that the increasing pollu-
tion of water resources endangers the public health, safety and wel-
fare. 26 Moreover, the leaders of the nation's industries, by their
decisions regarding cost-benefit assessment, policy formation, and
21 See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
implications of combining the terms "negligence" and "responsible."
22 On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground at Prince
William Sound, Alaska, creating the worst oil spill in United States history. See Largest
U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at
1, col. 1. It has been alleged that the ship's third mate, who lacked the requisite
Coast Guard authorization to operate a tanker, was in command of the Valdez at the
time of the accident and that the ship's captain, Joseph Hazelwood, was intoxicated.
Apparently Exxon knew that Hazelwood had a problem with alcohol, but
nevertheless allowed him to remain as the ship's captain. After the accident, Exxon's
Chairman admitted that this decision was a "gross error." Oil Tanker Captain Fined
After Failing Alcohol Test, Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1989, at 1, col. I (quoting Lawrence
Rawl, Chairman of Exxon).
23 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
24 See Labaton, Does an Assault on Nature Make Exxon a Criminal?, N.Y. Times, Apr.
23, 1989, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 1, col 3.
25 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
26 Industrial pollution was perceived as one of the most serious crimes facing
the nation. In 1984, when 60,000 people were asked to rank the severity of certain
crimes for a published poll, environmental crime was allocated to seventh place,
ahead of heroin smuggling and armed robbery. See Department ofJustice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin (Jan. 1984).
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personnel supervision, have a major impact on the success or failure
of achieving water-quality goals.27
The fundamental question raised by this Comment is whether
the introduction to the Clean Water Act of a criminal negligence
standard, coupled with the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine,
achieves meaningful deterrence without vitiating the due process
principles of the Constitution. Specifically, has there been a careful
balancing of public interests against due process personal liberty
interests ?28
Part I first reviews the historical use of strict liability criminal
sanctions to regulate water pollution. 29 It then examines the sanc-
tioning framework developed around the negligence standard of the
Clean Water Act and analyzes court decisions interpreting and refin-
ing the Act's criminal provisions.
30
Part II examines the evolution of the negligence standard and its
application to criminal law. It shows that the use of a tort ordinary
negligence standard in criminal law amounts to a disguised exten-
sion of the strict liability concept, exhibiting the same inherent weak-
nesses as strict liability criminality.3"
Part III analyzes the evolution of strict liability32 and the
"responsible share" doctrine, suggesting that Supreme Court deci-
sions confuse the two distinct issues of strict liability and vicarious
liability and ignore the existence of due process issues.33 The Com-
ment concludes by arguing that the introduction of a criminal negli-
gence standard has not cured the due process weaknesses of the
27 The perception of many of those who work in environmental enforcement is
that the failure to reach environmental goals often results from conscious cost-
benefit decisions by business owners and managers. For example, Judson Starr,
former Environmental Crimes Unit Director for the Department ofJustice Land and
Natural Resources Division, asserts that the acts of corporate defendants (and of
corporate officer defendants in particular) convicted for polluting the environment:
are generally willful, deliberate, rational, premeditated and committed
with some forethought over a long period of time .... [N]o perceptible
defense is generally offered-except that compliance was too expensive.
As a consequence, it usually can be said that the government was willfully
cheated and the public betrayed ... in terms of harm to the environment
... often by educated and privileged people who abuse their positions in
society.
Starr, Countering Environmental Crime;, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 382 (1986).
28 See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 84-92, 105-56 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 160-220 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
33 See hfira notes 246-64 and accompanying text.
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earlier strict liability sanctions in cases where those sanctions can
result in incarceration. 4 It further suggests that the Clean Water
Act's wedding of the "responsible share" doctrine to a negligence
standard creates a circularity of analysis that tends to confuse any
precise attribution of culpability. 5
I. THE EvOLUTION OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION REGULATIONS
A. The Refuse Act of 1899
Case law since the turn of the century reveals substantial disa-
greement over the degree of culpability requisite for a criminal viola-
tion of environmental law. With respect to water pollution, the issue
was raised first by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189936 ("Refuse
Act"). This Act, as drafted, appeared to be a formidable tool for the
deterrence of pollution, using criminal sanctions to proscribe any
introduction of "refuse" into the navigable waters.3 7 Quite simply,
the Refuse Act provided the legislatively innovative approach of
imposing strict criminal liability on anyone who placed "refuse" into
the nation's navigable waters.3 8 In 1906,Judge Aldrich, in In re Scow
No. 36," relied in part on innovations in British common law4 ° for
authority to affirm this "somewhat recent rule created to meet the
34 See infra notes 278-87 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
36 The Rivers and Harbors Act provides: "It shall not be lawful to throw,
discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship ... or from the shore ... manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind, shape or description
whatever other than that flowing ... in a liquid state into any navigable water ...."
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (emphasis
added) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1982)).
37 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)(providing that violation of the Refuse Act be
punishable by fine and or "imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less
than thirty days nor more than one year").
38 See supra note 36.
39 144 F. 932 (Ist Cir. 1906); see also United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of
Hartford, Inc., 195 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1952) (affirming sanctions under the strict
liability standard of the Refuse Act against barge owner for the negligent discharge of
oil).
40 See Scow, 144 F. at 933 ("The acts are properly construed as imposing the
penalty when the act is done, no matter how innocently... the substance of the [act
being] that a man shall take care that the statutory direction is obeyed, and that if he
fails to do so he does it at his peril." (quoting Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B. 168, 172-73
(1889)).
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demands of modem necessities. '"41 Judge Aldrich readily asserted42
that strict criminal liability attaches to the offending act:
without regard to the question of wilfulness or intent, and zoithout regard to
the question of mistake or innocence. The rule is, of course, in derogation
of the principles of the common law, and its drastic quality is justified
upon [the] grounds of necessity, and as in the interest of the public
good.
The expressed object of resorting to the exercise of plenary
power through arbitrary and exceptional remedies ... is to better
safeguard the public good in situations where the public good is
easily subject to imposition and injury through heedless, inadvertent, or
indifferent violations of laws enacted for the general welfare .... 43
Judge Aldrich conceptualized strict liability as a negligence
offense,4 4 with the negligence element implicitly assumed; liability
attached due to an "injury" caused by a "heedless" or "inadvertent"
violation of a legislatively proscribed harm.45 The radical departure
from common law negligence was that the state bore no burden of
proof regarding a deviation from a standard of care. Actus reus
swallowed mens rea, the two common law elements of proof being
reduced to the one.46 Judge Aldrich's justification for what he
termed this "derogation" of traditional principles was a need "to
better safeguard the public good" where the public is subject to
injury.47 Since the roots of both traditional criminal common law
and contemporary statutory law presumably rise from a societal need
to protect both "individual and public interests,"4 Judge Aldrich's
41 Id.
42 Perhaps Judge Aldrich might not have moved with such alacrity through the
analytic steps of criminal strict liability if the issue was one of incarceration and not
simply one of the collection of a fine. See id. (discussing pecuniary nature of
sanctions).
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 The same implicit use of a negligence standard in the strict liability context of
the Refuse Act appears in United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, Inc., 195 F.2d
369, 371 (2d Cir. 1952).
45 See Scow, 144 F. at 933.
46 This reformulation of the traditional criminal common law elements of
analysis of actus reus and mens rea is well expressed in contemporary terms by the
analysis of George Fletcher: "The fault that need not be proved in cases of strict
liability is not the fault of wrongdoing, but the fault of culpability .... What makes the
liability 'strict' is that the defendant's culpability need not be proven at trial." G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6.3, at 469 (1978).
47 Scow, 144 F. at 933.
48 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1962) ("The general purposes ... are to
forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens
substantial harm to individual or public interests.").
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inability to articulate precisely the genesis of these "modem necessi-
ties" 49 is unsurprising.
Prosecutorial enforcement of the Refuse Act did not parallel the
Act's strict textual language, 0 however, as the legislative history of
the Act was concerned primarily with navigational interference and
not with water quality.5' Until 1970, the primary prosecutions con-
cerned the physical obstruction of navigation and related traumatic
injuries.5 2 This interpretation dominated court rulings until. the
1960s, when the Refuse Act was harnessed for a newly perceived set
of needs.53
The impact of the Refuse Act was limited further by the use of
fines in lieu of the available sanction of incarceration.5 4 Conse-
quently, the issue of the deprivation of liberty for a strict liability
offense never arose under the Refuse Act.55 The issue, however, was
obliquely raised by its absence. In affirming the concept of strict lia-
bility under the Refuse Act in United States v. White Fuel Corporation,
56
the First Circuit noted that because "a corporate defendant like
White Fuel cannot be imprisoned, we need not consider to what
extent absolute liability would carry over to cases where incarcera-
tion is a real possibility."5 7 Accordingly, the court gingerly skirted
the issue, merely footnoting a state case upholding a fine while
49 Scow, 144 F. at 933.
50 For an in-depth analysis of the history of the Refuse Act, see Glenn, The Crime
of "Pollution '" The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, I I AM. CRIM. L. REv.
835, 839-59 (1973).
5! See S. REP. No. 224, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1888) (expressing concern with
regard to impediments to navigation caused by injurious pollution).
52 See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 427 (1958).
53 'Note that the Refuse Act specifically excludes from its purview "refuse matter
.flowing from streets and sewers ... in a liquid state .... 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)
(emphasis added). Obviously, water quality itself was not in the drafters' minds in the
original legislation. The 1960s, however, brought an interest in using the Refuse Act
in a broader context. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229-
31 (1966) (construing the Refuse Act to include oil as a kind of "refuse" whose
introduction into navigable waters violated the Refuse Act); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 494 (1960) (discharge of industrial solids suspended in
water through a sewer system violated the Refuse Act).
54 Cf Glenn, supra note 50, at 837-45 (referring to a general lack of enforcement
of the Refuse Act and mentioning instances of fines but none of incarceration).
55 This was largely true because most of the defendants convicted under the
Refuse Act were corporations, not individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard Oil
Co. of Hartford, Inc., 195 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1952) (fine imposed upon corporate
defendant after navigation was impeded by corporation's oil spill in river).
s 498 F.2d 619 (Ist Cir. 1974).
57 Id. at 623-24.
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rejecting as unconstitutional ajail term based on vicarious liability.58
The Supreme Court expressed the same gingerness nine years ear-
lier in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 59 when it sidestepped deter-
mining "what scienter requirement the [Refuse] Act imposes."
60
Indeed, over a span of ninety years, the Supreme Court has deftly
avoided deciding the issue of strict liability incarceration for a viola-
tion of the Refuse Act.
6 1
Given that it only affirmed the fining of a corporation, rather
than the incarceration of one of its officers, the White Fuel circuit
court was as comfortable with the concept of strict liability as the
judge in In re Scow No. 36 three quarters of a century earlier.6 2 The
First Circuit relied heavily on Justice Jackson's strict liability analysis
outlined in Morissette v. United States.63 Following Justice Jackson's
lead, the First Circuit asserted that the Refuse Act fell within the
domain of "public welfare offenses" for which neither scienter nor
58 See id. at 624 n.9 (footnoting Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155
A.2d 825 (1959) (reversing portion of sentence directing the incarceration of a tavern
owner whose employee had sold liquor to a minor)). Koczwara asserts:
Liability for all true crimes, wherein an offense carries with it a jail
sentence, must be based exclusively upon personal causation... . A man's
liberty cannot rest on so frail a reed as whether his employee will commit
a mistake in judgment .... Our own courts have stepped in time and
again to protect a defendant from being held criminally responsible for
acts about which he had no knowledge and over which he had little
control.
Koczwara, 397 Pa. at 585-86, 155 A.2d at 830.
Note that the First Circuit took cognizance of a case on which the rejection of the
sanction of incarceration was based on vicarious liability, not strict liability. See infra
note 250 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Supreme Court has
muddied the distinction between these two concepts.
59 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
60 Id. at 230 (refusing to consider what mens rea requirement the Act imposes,
"as those questions are not before us in this restricted appeal").
61 It is possible, however, that the issue may yet arise. The United States
Department of Justice's Indictments and Convictions Report for 1985 reports five
convictions in that year under the Refuse Act. See McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental
Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
1133, 1135 n.7 (1986).
62 See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
63 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The Morissette Court explained that strict liability is
appropriate for public welfare offimnses since these offenses are defined statutorily
and "are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it
imposes a duty." Id. at 255. Moreover, public welfare offenses endanger "the
efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order." Id. at 256. Intent is not
necessary because (1) the penalties are usually small, (2) conviction does not
stigmatize one's reputation, and (3) "whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is
the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity." Id.
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negligence need be proven.64 In the tradition of prior Refuse Act
court opinions,65 the First Circuit continued by noting that, in any
case, "the government presented facts from which negligence could
be inferred."-66 Citing the utilitarian theory of sanctions espoused by
Holmes,67 the court asserted (with a rhetorical flourish that suggests
some frustrations of its own) that there is a "benefit to society of
having an easily defined, enforceable standard which inspires perform-
ance rather than excuses."68
B. The Clean Water Act
As initially enacted, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
194869 (now the Clean Water Act) provided no criminal sanctions
for water polluters. The Act's prescribed pollution abatement proce-
dures were so complex and convoluted that informal negotiations
often proved more effective. 71 In addition, federal civil actions were
used only as a last resort.71 By 1971, it appeared that prosecutors
would not vigorously implement the sanctioning system of the Act.
In fact, despite an amendment to the Refuse Act providing that "it
shall be the duty of United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute
all offenders," 72 the Attorney General of the United States was held
to retain sole discretion in determining whether to prosecute a viola-
64 See United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-23 (1974).
65 See supra note 4 and accompanying text for an analysis of other strict liability
cases which use an implicit negligence standard.
66 White Fuel, 498 F.2d at 622.
67 See id. at 623 (citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 49 (1881)).
68 Id (emphasis added). Most, if not all, theorists of the criminal law see the
concept of "excuse" as central to the development of the equitable attribution of
criminal sanctions. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 6.8.2, at 511 (suggesting
that, even though there is an act of wrongdoing, the legal system "excuses" it when
caused by circumstances such as blindness, infancy, or insanity). The First Circuit
probably was referring to a broader concept of "excuse": the vain effort of White
Fuel to use due care as an excuse against a strict liability statute. See White Fuel, 498
F.2d at 623.
69 Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. VI 1988)).
70 See Glenn, supra note 50, at 836 n.7; see also Comment, The Federal Water
Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 893, 893-95 (describing the
Act's complex procedures).
71 See Glenn, supra note 50, at 836 n.7. For a thorough analysis of the
enforcement history of the early decades of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
see generally Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MiCH. L.
REV. 1103 (1970).
72 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1982).
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tor.7 ' Even given the liberalized interpretation of the Act by the
courts during the 1960s--an interpretation which addressed the
issue of water quality as well as the issue of navigational obstruc-
tions-prosecutors continued to use the Act until 1970 only to pur-
sue those violations which caused obstruction to navigation.
7 4
By 1972, in response to a groundswell of public opinion,75 Con-
gress realized that the enforcement of federal law regarding water
quality had not worked. This failure was due in large part to com-
plex civil enforcement procedures and administrative red tape. 76 In
the legislative hearings preceding the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972("1972 Amendments"), Senator Mus-
kie noted that the nation had "ignored" the cancer of "water
pollution," 7 7 asserting that "[o]ur planet is beset with a cancer which
threatens our very existence and which will not respond to the kind
of treatment that has been proposed in the past."-78 Another senator
commented that "[w]e have learned by disappointing experience...
that without strict enforcement and meaningful deterrents, water
pollution control laws will have no real effect."' 79 The conclusion
was that "the national effort to abate and control water pollution has
been inadequate in every vital aspect"8 0 and that "[t]he record shows
an almost total lack of enforcement .... [,with] [o]nly one case...
reach[ing] the courts in more than two decades."81
In this context the 197! Amendments were passed with the per-
ception that
sanctions under existing law have not been sufficient to encourage
compliance with the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
[I]f the timetables established . . . [for the restoration of the
nation's water] are to be met, the threat of sanction must be real, and
enforcement provisions must be swift and direct. Abatement orders, pen-
73 See Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y of Am. v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 339, 345-46 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). For an analysis of this legislative-executive
tension, see Glenn, supra note 50, at 841 n.27.
74 See Glenn, supra note 50, at 839 & n.18.
75 See generally R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING 173-98 (1962) (discussing how
chemicals have leaked into all areas of nature and DDT is present in all foods).
76 See Glenn, supra note 50, at 836 n.7.
77 118 CONG. REC. 33,692 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 33,716 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
80 S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
81 Id. at 5.
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alty provisions, and rapid access to the Federal District Court
should accomplish the objective of compliance.
82
The 1972 Amendments83 established a goal of complete elimi-
nation of the discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by
198584 in order to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 85 To achieve this ambi-
tious goal, the 1972 Amendments imposed the criminal sanction of,
inter alia, up to one year's imprisonment for any "person who will-
fully or negligently"86 discharges a pollutant from a point source
87
into the navigable waters. 8 8 While the same criminal sanctions
89
were initially equally available for either negligent or willful viola-
tions, the Act, as currently amended, has changed the word "will-
fully" to "knowingly" and made more stringent sanctions available
for knowing violations.9" Only the Act's civil penalties retain the
Refuse Act's concept of strict liability. 9 1 The Act further specifically
82 Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
83 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
84 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
86 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982) provides that violators "shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both."
87 A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance...
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
88 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982). The terms of § 1311 have the broadest inclusive
sweep of any of the Clean Water Acts's seven proscribed paragraphs whose violation
subjects the offender to criminal sanctions. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1328, 1345 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
89 See supra note 86.
90 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1987). The term "wilfully" was changed
to "knowingly" in the 1987 amendments and separated from "negligently" into its
own sub-paragraph (§ 1319(c)(1) for negligent violations and § 1319(c)(2) for
knowing violations). In contrast to negligent violations, the maximum penalty for
knowing violations was doubled to $50,000 for fines, and trebled to three years for
incarceration. Negligent violations under §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1345 were criminalized. All of these paragraphs were criminalized as well for knowing
violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982), as amended Feb. 4, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
4, § 312, 101 Stat. 7, 42 (1987) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (Supp. V
1987)).
91 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). It is interesting to note that, as
currently amended, the maximum amount of the per-day fine for "civil violation"
($25,000) is the same as that for a fine assessed as a criminal negligent violation. See
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)-(d) (Supp. V 1987). Since it is far easier to secure a conviction
under the civil law's "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof and its
facilitated discovery procedures, the government's seeking a negligent criminal
conviction requiring proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" makes sense only if the
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stipulated that "person" shall include "any responsible corporate
officer." 92 As is demonstrated later in this Comment, the concept of
"responsibility" has broad implications in the application of a negli-
gence standard to the corporate setting.
93
1. The Implementation of the Clean Water Act
Environmental violations and resultant injuries are exceedingly
difficult to detect, so that, as one environmental prosecutor stated,
even in "the most egregious cases, the harm will often not appear for
years, or decades." 9' 4 As a consequence, both legislative drafting and
judicial interpretation of such legislation tend to make the sanctions
stringent and the prosecutorial access to those sanctions efficient and
flexible, thereby offsetting the inevitably small risk of discovery of
any one individual polluter.9" In seeking to design and interpret
laws that will influence industry's managers regarding potential
harms to the Nation's water resources, however, the focus of both
Congress and the courts has been more on the need for effective and
immediate deterrence than on any balancing of that interest against
the individual's due process rights.96 Although prosecutors often
perceive the criminal sanctioning of the corporate entity as ineffec-
tive (since the corporation can only be fined and not jailed), they
perceive the incarceration of the corporate officer as a potent
prosecutorial weapon confronting the corporate manager personally
government intended to secure a sentence of incarceration for maximum deterrence
impact.
92 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (Supp. V 1987).
93 See infra notes 246-64 and accompanying text. A major point stressed in this
Comment is that since the concept of criminal "responsibility" has a standard of care
that is implicit to its definition, the marriage of the "responsibility" concept to a
negligence standard creates liabilities that may stretch well beyond the intentions of
the framers of the Clean Water Act.
94 Starr, supra note 27, at 383.
95 See id. Starr asserts that "[flor every case of criminal pollution that is detected
and prosecuted, dozens, even hundreds, continue undetected and unabated. The
penalty must, therefore, be large enough to deter others who ill-advisedly run the
risk that their illegal activity will go undetected and unpunished." Id.
96 See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible due
process limitations to the imposition of the criminal sanction of imprisonment in the
absence of any proof of mens rea. The Supreme Court, despite the protestation by
legal scholars over the Court's passivity in the face of clear substantive due process
issues, see Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1076-77
(1964), has tended to find any constitutional requirement of mens rea to be illusory.
See infra text accompanying notes 234-42.
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and palpably.97 A corporation, prosecutors have learned, too often
regards a fine as simply a "mere cost of doing business."
98
A review of legal environmental literature reveals near unanim-
ity in approving criminal sanctions aimed directly at corporate offi-
cials which could result in their incarceration. As one commentator
rather cynically summarized:
Many companies amass vast fortunes and are willing to pay nomi-
nal fines in lieu of abating pollution. Nevertheless, jail a corporate
officer who allows, or is in a position to know that his firm is
allowing pollutants to reach our waters, and I am sure that he will
quickly come to realize how important clean water really is and how
its company can best eliminate his problems.
99
Commentators have noted that "because of [the executive's] failure
to supervise the activities of those under his control . . . . [and
because] of the decentralization of the corporate body, many execu-
tives may [unwittingly] become criminals."' 00 These commentators
conclude' 0 ' that "[t]he law should impose an affirmative duty upon
the corporate official to discover and control."'
10 2
2. Defining the Reach of the Clean Water Act
By the mid to late 1970s, the breadth'0 3 of criminal liability cre-
ated by the Clean Water Act began to be felt, in part due to the
"charitable construction" of the act by the courts.10 4
In United States v. Hamel, 105 the first case concluded successfully
against an individual under the criminal provisions of the Clean
97 See Starr, supra note 27, at 383.
98 Id. at 382.
99 Lavin, Enforcement of Environmental Law on the Local Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 97 (C. Hasset ed. 1971).
100 Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the
Environment, 37 ALB. L. REV. 61, 71 (1972).
101 See id. at 71-72.
102 Id. at 71.
103 To give a far-fetched illustration of the breadth of this construction: Even a
glass of hot water carelessly spilled onto a dry creek bed could technically put a
person in violation of the criminal sanctions of the Clean Water Act. "Heat" is
defined in § 1362 as a pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). A glass is a "discrete
conveyance" qualifying it as a "point source," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982 & Supp. V
1987), and even a dry creek bed is "navigable waters" under the interpretation of
United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975).
While the discretion of federal prosecutors, judges, juries and appellate courts stands
in the way of such a misuse of the Act, such interpretive breadth and scope
nevertheless must give one pause.
104 See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
105 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977).
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Water Act, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction of a yard fore-
man for discharging hundreds of gallons of gasoline onto a frozen
lake. ' 6 The court construed the term "pollutant" to include the
broad range of "any refuse matter"' 7 stipulated by the Refuse Act,
specifically noting the necessity that the "interpretation of water pol-
lution legislation . . . be given a generous rather than a niggardly
construction." ''"8 The court in United States v. Phelps Dodge Corpora-
tion' 0 9 used the same generous statutory construction, construing
the Clean Water Act as "public welfare" legislation." 0 The court
interpreted the Clean Water Act's prohibition of pollutant dis-
charges into "navigable waters" as covering "any waterway, including
normally dry arroyos, where any water... might flow therein" to any
body of water in which there is a "public interest."'"
C. The Appropriate Criminal Standard of Care
Given no prior use of an ordinary negligence standard in a fed-
eral criminal statute,' 12 it is surprising that the standard was not
specified or defined in the Clean Water Act, in the legislative his-
tory," t3 or by federal appellate courts in the early years of the stat-
106 See id. at 108.
107 Id. at 110. The Clean Water Act's statutory definition of "pollutant" is quite
broad even without judicial expansion: "The term 'pollutant' means dredged soil,
solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or
discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and
agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
108 Hamel, 551 F.2d at 112 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S.
224, 226 (1966)). The district court, however, also was "generous" in assigning the
minimal criminal sanction allowed under the Clean Water Act, a fine of $2,500, with
neither probations nor incarceration.
109 391 F. Supp. 1181 (1975).
1 10 Id. at 1186. The District -Court asserted: " 'We believe that ... the United
States Congress was convinced that uncontrolled pollution of the nation's waterways
is a threat to the health and welfare of the country ....... "Id. (quoting United States
v. Ashland Oil & Transp., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974)).
111 Id. at 1187. Another district court followed this policy of using the
"broadest possible constitutional interpretation" to determine that a spray irrigation
system that oversaturated fields constituted a discharge from a "point source" into
"navigable" waters. See United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., 487 F.
Supp. 852, 854-55 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
112 See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
113 The one anecdotal reference in the legislative history is made by
Representative Harsha: "[I]n this legislation, we already can charge a man for simple
negligence, we can charge him with a criminal violation under this bill for simple
negligence." 118 CONG. REc. 33.695 (1972) (statement of Rep. Harsha). Such a
brief and anecdotal comment by a legislator is not to be deemed strongly indicative
of legislative intent. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986)
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ute's tenure. Like water, the standard was allowed to seek its own
level in the federal courts. In an early case brought under the Act,
the court instructed the jury that an offense is committed negligently
"if done wantonly and recklessly, manifesting an utter disregard for
the law and the rights and safety of others." '1 1 4 Not surprisingly, the
application of that stringent standard resulted in an acquittal.!
1 5
Professor Rodgers,' 16 following the American Law Institute's propo-
sal, advanced an alternative negligence standard for the Clean Water
Act as "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation."
'1 17
The standard, however, that dominates the courts' interpreta-
tion of the Clean Water Act is borrowed from tort's ordinary negli-
gence: "The term 'negligence' means failure to use reasonable care.
Reasonable care is the care which a reasonably careful person would
use under similar circumstances."
1 1 8
A second anomaly appearing in the early implementation of the
Clean Water Act was the prosecutors' practice of indicting defend-
ants on a single charge of "willfully and negligently violating" the
Act. 1 9 Prosecutors viewed the addition of the negligence charge,
working in concert with the "responsible corporate officer" doc-
trine, 12 as a safety net for situations in which the carrying of the
(stating that statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling
effect).
114 United States v. American Beef Packer, Crim. No. 74-0-30 (D. Nev. 1974),
quoted in 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 603 n.101 (1986).
115 See id.
116 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 114, at 603 n.101.
117 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 48, at § 2.02(2)(d).
118 Court's Instructions, instruction #21, United States v. Hoflin, No. CR85-
82T (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1986), af'd, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (instructions on
file with University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
119 See, e.g., United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F.Supp
852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that an indictment charging defendant with
"willfully and negligently violat[ing]" the Clean Water Act is valid in that the mens
rea required for negligent conduct and for willful conduct cannot be viewed as
entirely distinct where defendant sprayed an overabundance of fertilizer on his fields
so that some ran into a nearby stream); United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1445, 1446 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (noting that an indictment that charges
"willfully and negligently violates" instead of "wilfully or negligently violates" is
nevertheless one charge with the two adverbs merely specifying the "mode or
method by which this proscribed conduct %Vas accomplished"); see also Indictment,
count 3, at 5, United States v. Hoflin, No. CR85-82T (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1986)
(charging defendant with "willfully and negligently violat[ing]" the Clean Water
Act), aff'd, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (Indictment on file with University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
120 See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
952 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:935
burden of proof on the element of scienter (willfully or knowingly)
was in question. The former director of the Department of Justice
Environmental Crimes Unit commented that, in United States v. A.C.
Lawrence Leather Co.,121 the president and vice president were
charged with "failing to seek out, discover and stop"' 22 the dis-
charge of pollutants from the tannery into the adjacent river. "This
doctrine," the former direcitor asserted, "is available to prosecutors
when the evidence indicates some willfulness by the executive who
seeks to 'blind' himself from. the occurrence of illegal acts performed
within his bailiwick."
1 23
The former director's words suggest that the negligence charge
is applied to situations in which the government fully believes, but
perhaps cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defend-
ants knowingly discharged pollutants. In such a situation, the negli-
gence concept and the "responsible officer" concept are harnessed
and married into a single and effective prosecutorial tool: the
"responsible officer" becomes a "reasonably careful officer" who (1)
should have known of a violation and therefore (2) failed in his duty to
act on what he should have known. In this context the two standards,
working in tandem, have the effect of exponentially increasing the
scope of the negligence standard.
124
D. The Reach of the Clean Water Act's Negligence Standard
With the broad foundations of prosecutorial discretion and stat-
utory construction initially established, the Third Circuit focused
major attention on the Clean Water Act's criminal negligence stan-
dard in United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc.' 25 Frezzo was the first case
to consider in some depth the issue of an ordinary negligence
26
121 Crim. No. 82-01-07-L (D.N.H. 1982).
122 Starr, supra note 27, at '391. Judson Starr is the former Environmental
Crimes Unit Director for the Department of Justice Land and Natural Resources
Division. See id. at 379 n.*. He served as a director from 1982-88. See 2 MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY 1809B (122 ed. 1990).
123 Id. at 391 n.47.
124 See infra notes 241-59 and accompanying text for an analysis of the impact
of marrying the "responsible officer doctrine" to the ordinary negligence standard.
125 461 F. Supp 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
126 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 defines tort negligence as "conduct ...
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 282 (1965).
Section 283 states that the standard is that of a "reasonable man under like
circumstances." Id. at § 283. Section 284 defines "conduct" to include (1) an act or
(2) a failure to act where there is a duty to act. See id. at § 284.
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criminal standard as applied to the federal "responsible corporate
officer doctrine" where the issue of incarceration was involved.' 27 In
Frezzo, the trial judge defined criminal negligence under the Clean
Water Act "as the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person
would do or to use ordinary care under the circumstances."' 28 The
jury found the defendants (the president and secretary of a small cor-
poration engaged in the growing of mushrooms) guilty of two counts
of negligent violation of the Clean Water Act caused by the inade-
quate capacity of the corporation's holding-tank. The government's
case was based on the theory that the holding-tank for manure com-
posts "was too small to contain the compost wastes after a rain-
storm." '129 As a consequence, when the manure overflowed into a
stream after a rainfall, the defendants became criminally liable on the
theory that they "had negligently discharged pollutants into the
stream."
13 0
Some critics have derided Frezzo, one text dryly noting that the
"government has amassed an impressive string of victories against
small, family-owned mushroom companies."' 3 ' Frezzo offers an
excellent paradigm, however, of an application of the negligence
standard of the Clean Water Act to responsible corporate officers.'
3 2
While the district court commented that the defendant had "control
and ownership of the premises"' 33 and that one brother knew that
the holding-tank held all the water only "95% of the time,"'
' 34
127 See Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1130 n.l1.
128 See infra note 157 and accompanying text for an analysis of other negligence
standards that have been applied to Clean Water Act violations.
129 Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1125.
130 Id. Count five, a negligence count, was used to invoke the sanction of
incarceration. See id. at 1130 n.10. The Frezzos were also found guilty of knowing
violations on other counts, but the jail sentence was imposed only for the negligence
violation. See id.
131 J. BONINE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 941
(1984). The authors presumably were wondering why the government was not
bringing such actions against larger industrial corporations whose conduct could
have a far larger impact upon water quality. There could have been advantages for
the government, however, in initially choosing defendants of limited financial means
during the years when this fledgling standard of "ordinary negligence" was being
interpreted initially by the courts. Of interest on this point is that the Frezzos
dismissed their counsel following their unsuccessful appeal and came before the
Third Circuit a second time on, among other issues, the question of constitutionally
inadequate counsel. See United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 642 F.2d 59, 63 n.15 (3d
Cir. 1981).
132 This is true even though the Third Circuit relegated the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine to footnotes. See Frezzo, 602 F.2d at 1129 n.7, 1130 n. 11.
133 Frezzo, 461 F. Supp. at 270.
134 Id.
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neither the district court nor the Third Circuit articulated what req-
uisite facts were necessary for "responsibility"
13 5 to attach. 136
Furthermore, the Frezzo interpretation (in the context of a negli-
gence charge) of the phrase "the discharge of any pollutant by any per-
son shall be unlawful" changes the connotation of the word
"discharge" from active to passive. One might argue that there was
not, precisely speaking, a discharge made by the Frezzos. Rather,
rain fell on a tank that at least one of these two corporate officers
knew was not always large enough to contain the rain.
1 37
To sustain an ordinary negligence conviction, all that is required
is that a reasonable person or reasonable responsible corporate
officer would have perceived the risk; no proof of knowledge is
required.1 38 Once the relevant risks are isolated, a defendant is
"negligent" if he fails to account for and correct these risks. As in
Frezzo, this holds true regardless of whether the risk is unreasonably
high or whether the defendant created the risk by careless conduct.
Thus, the "responsible corporate officer doctrine" extends the
reach of the negligence standard by (1) determining which risks a
responsible officer should know and then (2) holding that officer to an
affirmative duty of care concerning those risks.' 39 Analytically, this
theory of liability lies very close to a strict liability construct, but it is
one that the judicial system applies retrospectively as opposed to true
strict liability-a liability which a legislature imposes prospectively on a
certain class of harms or conduct.1
40
135 The prosecution presented no evidence of scienter by the second brother,
Guido Frezzo. He.. .was presumably sentenced to jail as a "responsible corporate
officer" without any direct evidence that he had knowledge that the holding tank was
only fully effective "95% of the time." Thus, one way of interpreting Frezzo is that
one of the defendants was sentenced to jail for his status as a corporate officer in a
company which violated the Act, the requisite "responsibility" being inferred from
that status. This is made possible because proof of subjective knowledge is not
requisite for the violation of an ordinary negligence standard which measures
culpability against a normative standard of what the actor should have known. See infra
notes 158-81 and accompanying text.
136 Given the fact-pattern presented by Exxon's 1989 oil spill off Valdez, Alaska
from a tanker that may have been negligently run aground, the officers of Exxon
might all read Frezzo and pause. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
137 See Frezzo, 461 F. Supp. at 270.
138 See supra note 118 and accompanying text for an analysis of the ordinary
negligence standard of care.
139 See supra note 121 and accompanying text for the use of this same
conceptualization to address a different prosecutorial problem in A.C. Lawrence
Leather Co.
140 See Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 744-
45 (1960).
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E. The Negligence Standard as Applied to Industrial "Accidents'"
The incarceration of the Frezzos also raises the additional issue
of the use of incarceration to address industrial "design failures," for
the Frezzos would not have been jailed if they had designed and
installed a larger tank (or if less rain had fallen). The question thus
posed for industry's managers is a vital one: when are they criminally
liable for establishing policies and making cost-risk assessments both
in the areas of plant equipment and in operational procedures?
14 1
There have been at least two cases before the courts implicating this
issue. The first and most notable case is United States v. Ashland Oil,
Inc.'42 On January 2, 1988, one of Ashland Oil's storage tanks col-
lapsed, spilling more than 500,000 gallons of oil into the Mononga-
hela River.' 43 On September 15, 1988, a federal grand jury indicted
Ashland Oil for negligently violating the Clean Water Act.' 4 4 While
only the corporation was indicted, those officers who could be
deemed "responsible" for the design and installation of the tank cer-
tainly were subject to indictment during the ongoing "inquiry."' 4 5
In fact, Ashland Oil had admitted that "routine tests weren't con-
ducted on the tank ... and that following proper procedures might
have prevented the vessel from rupturing." 146
Precisely because strict liability statutes require an antecedent judgment
of per se unreasonableness, they necessarily require a more general
classification of the kind of activity which is to be regulated. They tend,
and perhaps inherently so, to neglect many features which ought to be
taken into account before such a judgment is forthcoming. Criminal
negligence, on the other hand, demands an essentially a posteriori
judgment as to the conduct in a particular case. As such, it surely
provides more opportunity for the jury to consider just those facts which
are most significant in determining whether the standard of care was
observed.
Id.
141 See Starr, supra note 27, at 382-83 (arguing that businessmen's cost-benefit
analyses can lead to the conclusion that it is cheaper to pay a fine if caught violating
an environmental law than to correct the environmental hazard).
142 See Indictment at count 2, United States v. Ashland Oil Co., No. 88-146
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1988). The indictment alleges that "defendant ASHLAND OIL,
INC. did negligently discharge and negligently cause to be discharged pollutants,
including but not limited to oil, from a point source, including a storm drain, into the
Monongahela River, a navigable water of the United States, without a permit." Id.
143 See id. at introduction.
144 See Wartzman, Ashland Faces Criminal Counts From Fuel Spill, Wall St. J., Sept.
16, 1988, at 48, col. 4.
145 See id.
146 Id. Ashland Oil was fined $2.25 million and has paid approximately $18
million in clean-up costs and civil claims. See $2.25 Million Fine In '88 Spill, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1989, at A16, col. 5.
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In another case, United States v. Pennwalt Corp., a tank containing
chemicals collapsed and allegedly spilled more than 75,000 gallons
into an adjacent tidal waterway.' 4 7 A grand jury returned indict-
ments against both the corporation and several corporate officers,
charging them with "negligently... discharg[ing] ... certain hazard-
ous chemicals ... as the result of the collapse of a... poorly main-
tained . . . steel storage tank."' 48 The government indicted the
former vice president of the company's chemical division, the former
president of the inorganic chemical division, and the former man-
ager of manufacturing for the inorganic chemical division. Each of
these individuals were corporate officers who, because of the large
size of the company and the location of its corporate headquarters in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 149 presumably only rarely (if at all) vis-
ited the Tacoma, Washington plant where the accident occurred.
The government asserted in a press release regarding Pennwalt
that "[a]ccording to the Indictment, the defendants had a duty to
establish and implement procedures to detect the presence of weak-
ened structures used to store chemicals and to anticipate and per-
form such maintenance as necessary to prevent release of such
chemicals."' 50 The Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the
case commented on the unique nature of the indictment, noting that
"[ilt's one of the very first cases where a company is being charged
with a crime without establishing criminal intent."'' Eventually, the
chief executive of Pennwalt entered a guilty plea on behalf of the
corporation and agreed thai: the corporation would pay a $1.1 mil-
lion fine.'
52
The language of the government's press release quoted above
illustrates the potential commonality between the strict liability and
negligence standards: "the defendants had a duty to . . . perform
such maintenance as necessary to prevent release of such chemicals."
In other words, if chemicals are released, the duty has been per se
violated. The key distinction, of course, is between the words "as
necessary" and the words "as reasonably necessary,"' 5 ' as the latter
147 See United States Attorney for Western District of Washington, Department
ofJustice News Release 1-2 (May 20, 1988) [hereinafter News Release].
148 Id.
149 See 2 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1988, at 4190-91.
150 News Release, supra note 147, at 2-3.
151 Egan, Putting a Face on Corporate Crime, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1989, at B8, col. 4
(emphasis added).
152 See Pennwalt's Chief OfficerAdmits Company's Guilt, Wall St.J., Aug. 10, 1989, at
C9, col. 1.
153 Indictment, count 1, at 5-6, United States v. Pennwalt, Inc., No. 88-55T
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allows the defense of due care. Even with the introduction of the
concept of reasonableness, however, the definition of what consti-
tutes due care may tend to change as one's perspective and time-
frame change. Once a serious industrial accident occurs and criminal
charges are brought, the jury must determine ex post what was "rea-
sonable" conduct on the part of the corporate officer in fulfilling this
affirmative duty of care. Yet, the corporate officer can only make that
determination ab initio in the context of his role as a financial planner
and decision maker. The officer, of course, presumably is aware that
his corporate superiors may assess his performance, in part, on its
relation to the "bottom line."' 54 In contrast, however, the jury will
make the legal evaluation of him performance with the luxury of
hindsight and without the onus of concern for financial constraints.
II. THE USE OF AN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE STANDARD IN CRIMINAL
LAW
The next two parts of this Comment address the issue of
whether, as interpreted by the courts, any measurable degree of
mens rea is required for conviction and incarceration under the crim-
inal negligence standard of the Clean Water Act. Part II addresses
the issue of the appropriateness of the use of an ordinary tort negli-
gence standard as applied to the Act. Part III examines the impact of
the "responsible corporate officer doctrine" as it interacts with the
negligence standard in defining the scope and reach of liability.
A. The Criminal Negligence Standard and Mens Rea
Since the 1972 Amendments neither specify a negligence stan-
(W.D. Wash. May 18, 1988). The indictment, in contrast to the press release, uses
the language "to anticipate and perform such maintenance as reasonably necessary to
prevent releases of chemicals into the waters of the United States, and to take such
other preventive steps as reasonably appropriate under the circumstances." Id.
(emphasis added).
154 See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick " An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 386, 398-99 (1981). Coffee notes
that the middle level manager is caught between Scylla and Charybdis: if he does not
produce, he is always subject to being replaced. "He knows that if he cannot achieve
a quick fix, another manager is waiting in the wings, eager to assume operational
control over a division." Id. at 398. Coffee suggests that the tensions inherent in the
manager's job make him powerless in response to a "myopic notion of accountability
that looks only to the bottom line of the income statement." Id. Of course, the in
terrorem possibilities of incarceration may serve the role of helping such a middle
manager to don a more far-sighted pair of glasses. Perhaps this was precisely
Congress's intent. Even so, the question remains: at what cost to the principles of
due process and the constitutional protections accorded to individual liberties?
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dard in text nor identify a standard in the legislative history,' 55 the
courts were left to determine the appropriate standard.' 56 While
there were some differences in the Act's early years as to whether to
use the common law's "gross negligence" standard or to borrow tort
law's more rarely used (in terms of its criminal application) ordinary
negligence standard, the ordinary negligence standard appears to be
uniformly applied today.
15 7
This leaves the Clean Water Act as the only instance in federal
law in which ordinary negligence can result in criminal conviction
and incarceration. 158 Congress, in its expressed desire for "swift
and direct" enforcement, 59 presumably could have elected to incor-
porate the negligence-free strict liability standard of the Refuse Act,
with its greatly eased burden of proof,' into the Clean Water Act.
Perhaps, however, Congress heard a subtle warning in the Supreme
Court's reserving the issue of the constitutionality of incarceration
for a strict liability offense in Standard Oil Co. and sought to head off a
confrontation on this issue.161 Whatever its motive, Congress chose
to add the element of at least a nominal mens rea negligence stan-
dard when it introduced criminal sanctions in the 1972 Amend-
ments. In fact, the 1972 Amendments' legislative history states that
the penalty of imprisonment would be provided only for "knowing"
violations.' 62 While most theorists do not consider negligence to be
a "knowing violation" (in that negligence is assessed as a deviation
from a normative judgment and not as an actual subjective state of
155 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text for the initial disharmony
among the negligence standards used by district courts.
157 In United States v. Hofln, the court's instructions read: "The term
'negligence' means failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is the care which
a reasonably careful person would use under similar circumstances." Court's
Instructions, instruction #21, United States v. Hoflin, No. CR85-82T (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 3, 1986), aft'd, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989).
158 See infra note 180 for a discussion of the treatment of involuntary
manslaughter under federal law.
159 See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
legislative history of the Clean Water Act.
160 See Abrams, supra note 4, at 473 ("One of the traditional functions of a strict
liability approach is to relieve the prosecution of having to prove culpability in
conditions of a large caseload or where culpability is likely to be present and yet may
be difficult to prove.").
161 See supra note 59-61 and accompanying text.
162 "The Committee further recognizes that sanctions under existing law have
not been sufficient to encourage compliance with the provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Therefore, the Committee proposes to increase significantly
the penalties for knowing violations .... S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5
(1971).
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mind 65 ), the drafters apparently equated negligence with
"knowing."164
One possible explanation for the absence of a definition or an
explanation of intent regarding the negligence standard in the Clean
Water Act is that using an undefined negligence standard in the Act
may reflect Congress' reluctance to depart from the Refuse Act's
strict liability standards.' 65 The negligence standard thus acts as a
prosecutorial safety net to snare violators when subjective knowing
could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 166 In this respect,
the Act's negligence standard, when interpreted as ordinary negli-
gence and coupled with the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine,
serves as a crude replacement for the Refuse Act's strict liability
standard.' 6 7
Under common law, however, normally "[m]ere negligence or
carelessness is not enough to impose criminal liability .... The con-
duct of accused must have been such as to show an utter .... wanton
disregard for the safety or rights of others who might reasonably be
expected to be injured thereby."' 68 In most instances, criminal lia-
bility only attached when there was a finding of gross negligence or
carelessness and "some measure of wantonness or recklessness."' 1
69
LaFave and Scott postulate that the "something extra" required of
the common law's criminal negligence standard was either (1) con-
duct that typically created a higher degree of risk than that required
by tort negligence, or (2) conduct characterized by the defendant's
conscious realization of the risk being created.' 70 The former crite-
rion obviously requires a higher level of negligence than tort negli-
163 See G. FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 6.2.1, at 396-401.
164 One says "apparently" simply because there was no recorded discussion or
definition given to this newly federalized negligence standard. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
165 See Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties In the Enforcement of
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 16 n.62 (1978).
166 Cf Abrams, supra note 4, at 473 (noting that strict liability relieves the
already burdened prosecutor from proving culpability). The government's burden of
proof in criminal cases ("beyond a reasonable doubt") is so great that there may be
some legislative inclination simply to reduce what needs to be proven. Judge
Learned Hand fervently expressed the frustrations attendant on this prosecutorial
burden as follows: "Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage.... He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve."
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
167 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
168 65A CJ.S. Negligence § 306, at 1074 (2d ed. 1966).
169 Id. at 1074-75.
170 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 232 (2d ed. 1986).
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gence, in that it necessitates a greater showing of ignored risk to
impose liability. The latter criterion is, of course, absent from the
concept of ordinary tort negligence,' 7 which only asks what a rea-
sonable person would have done under the circumstances, without
inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the actor. This difference
between tort and criminal law negligence is justified by the different
goals of these areas. Excluding the role of punitive damages, the
arguable goal of tort law is the restitution of the injured, whereas the
criminal law seeks punishment of the actor.'
72
More than a century ago, however, Holmes implicitly suggested
that tort and criminal law have a common core, in that "when men
live in a society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual
peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general
welfare."' 73 Perhaps, then, general deterrence, not personal subjec-
tive culpability, is the central purpose of laws that attach criminal
liability to mere ordinary negligence. 7' General deterrence is typi-
cally of paramount importance when the risk of harm runs high, as in
statutes criminally penalizing negligent driving that results in
death'7 1 or in trials finding parents criminally liable for the neglect
of their children.' 
76
171 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 126, at § 282 (defining
tort negligence as "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm"); id. at § 283 (defining the
required standard of conduct as "that of a reasonable [person] under like
circumstances"); id. at § 284 (defining conduct to include (1) an act or (2) a failure to
act where there is a duty to act).
172 See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
239, 244-45 (R. Rabin ed. 1983). But see G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 21,
26-29 (1970) (making accident-causing conduct expensive is a way of fostering
general deterrence).
173 0. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 108.
174 See supra note 1 and accompanying quotation for Holmes' thoughts on this
debatable subject.
175 See, e.g., State v. Pope, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 712, 313 A.2d 84 (1972); State v.
Miles, 203 Kan. 707, 457 P.2d 166 (1969); Commonwealth v. Burke, 6 Mass. App. Ct.
697, 383 N.E.2d 76 (1978); People v. Hill, 16 Mich. App. 229, 167 N.W.2d 799
(1969). See generally Annotation, What Amounts to Negligence Within The Meaning of
Statutes Penalizing Negligent Homicid by Operation of a Motor Vehicle, 20 A.L.R.3d 473
(1968) (citing opinions from the District of Columbia and ten states for the
proposition that "[m]any cases have held or recognized that a showing of ordinary
negligence is sufficient to convict an accused under a vehicular negligent homicide
statute describing the punishable misconduct in terms of 'negligence' without any
modification or qualification being attached to such a word").
176 For example, in one much discussed case, an American Indian couple were
convicted of manslaughter when their child died from an untreated infected tooth
even though the parent's "ordinary negligence" appeared to be a consequence of
their lack of education and their fear that white doctors would take their child away
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State courts provide no uniform answer to the question of
whether using a negligence standard as a criminal standard requires
a high degree of negligence, knowledge of risk, neither, or both,177
and state legislatures feel free to provide criminal sanctions for a
broad range of merely negligent conduct, including, for example,
"willfully or negligently allow[ing] ... livestock to run at large." 178
Federal law, however, avoids the use of a criminal negligence stan-
dard except in the Clean Water Act and in a federal involuntary man-
slaughter charge in which the statute reads "without due caution and
circumspection."' 79 In light of the way the courts have interpreted
the Clean Water Act, the federal courts curiously interpret the invol-
untary manslaughter statute's language of "with due care and cir-
cumspection" as requiring a showing of "gross negligence."
18 0
Furthermore, under this interpretation of gross negligence, the actor
must have been aware of the risk. 8 ' The fact that, in stark contrast,
the federal courts' interpretation of the Clean Water Act has gravi-
tated to both ordinary negligence and an objective standard of care
perhaps shows the different treatment accorded statutes that come
under the public welfare domain.
B. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code ("Code") presents a compromise
between the tensions inherent in the conflicting standards described
in the above section. The Code defines criminal negligence to
require a relatively objective standard of care, but it also requires a
gross deviation from that standard. Specifically, the Code recom-
mends that criminal liability should attach to negligence only when
there is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person in the actor's situation would use.' 82 This standard still holds
from them. They simply had no knowledge of their "negligence." See State v.
Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
177 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 30, at 208-18
(1972).
178 WASH. REV. CODE § 16.24.065 (1988).
179 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982).
180 See United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that
federal law requires gross negligence with actual or constructive knowledge of risk to
sustain a charge of involuntary manslaughter (citing United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d
462, 463 (9th Cir. 1979)).
181 See id.
182 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 48, at § 2.02(2)(d) commentary. The
Code defines criminal negligence as follows:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
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the actor to an objective standard of a reasonable person, but it seeks
to put this reasonable person in the shoes of the actor.183 The effort
of asking the trier of fact to adopt momentarily the perceptions of
the actor thus satisfies a crucial step in the rational attribution of
criminal sanctions to wrongful acts. 184 "[C]ould the actor have been
fairly expected to avoid the act of wrongdoing? Did he or she have
[a] fair opportunity to perceive the risk?"' 8 5 Since under this con-
ceptualization the actor is only liable if he should have known of the
risk, one critic notes that the question posed by the Code formula-
tion is "whether the actor can fairly be blamed for not knowing of
the risk."' 86 The Code further asks the trier of fact to evaluate the
nature of the risk as one that- a reasonable person would recognize as
both "substantial" and "unjustifiable."1 87 Accordingly, the taking of
such a risk "does not even raise a question of liability ... unless the
social costs outweigh the benefits of the risk and therefore render it
'unjustified.'"188 Culpability derives, then, "not from the choice to
violate a legal imperative, but from the failure to meet reasonable
standards of attentiveness."'
89
While the Code's definition of criminal negligence uses what
might be termed a "synthetic" mens rea' 9 ° because the actor in fact
may not be aware of the risk,'' it does provide due process safe-
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id.
183 See id.
184 Fletcher argues that the careful analysis of the issue of culpability in the
criminal law requires recognition that an act can be "wrong" without requiring
punishment. If an insane man murders another he has committed a wrongful act, but
society does not "attribute" culpability to him. In essence, he is "excused." See G.
FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 6.8.2, at 511-12.
185 Id. § 6.8.1, at 510.
186 Id. § 6.6.6, at 485.
187 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 48, at § 2.02(2)(d).
188 G. FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 4.3, at 261.
189 Id. § 4.3, at 262.
190 See Packer, supra note 6, at 143 (stating that negligence is the "absence of a
state of mind .... an extension rather than an example of the idea of mens rea in the
traditional sense" (footnote omitted)).
191 The drafters of the Model Penal Code were quite aware of the limitations of
this newly defined concept of mens rea:
The fourth kind of culpability is negligence. It is distinguished from
purposeful, knowing or reckless action in that it does not involve a state of
awareness. A person acts negligently under this subsection when he
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guards for the accused. First, it defines the nature of the risk taken
and a reasonable standard of care to be exercised towards such a
risk. Second, it defines a failure of perception that forms the basis of
culpability. As with strict liability, such a standard imposes sanctions
based on an external standard that ignores the actual state of mind of
the offender.' 92 This criminal negligence standard, however, attrib-
utes liability quite precisely to the absence of a particular state of
mind."9 ' It provides to the trier of fact a method of analysis for
determining when the actor is required by law both to perceive cer-
tain risks and to act on those perceptions. Thus, even without the
Code's additional requirement of a "gross deviation" from the stan-
dard of care,' 94 the use of its carefully defined, step by step negli-
gence standard as a jury instruction applicable to the Clean Water
Act would afford the trier of fact the opportunity to examine whether
or not the absence of a defined particular state of mind was a culpable
absence in the actor's situation. This allows for a far more precise
determination of criminal culpability than that reached under the
current federal court interpretation of the Clean Water Act's negli-
gence standard as mere ordinary negligence.
195
C. A Review of Critical Commentary on the Issue of Culpability
The notions that the criminal sanction of incarceration should
not attach to strict liability offenses and that deprivation of liberty
should only attach when subjective culpability is present are wide-
inadvertently creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which he ought
to be aware. He is liable if given the nature and degree of the risk, his
failure to perceive it is, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, a gross deviation from the
care that would be exercised by a reasonable person in his situation....
And again it is quite impossible to avoid tautological articulation of the
final question. The tribunal must evaluate the actor's failure of perception
and determine whether, under all the circumstances, it was serious
enough to be condemned.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 48, § 2.02 commentary (emphasis added).
192 See Packer, supra note 6, at 138. Packer praises the Model Penal Code in that
"[i]t can be shown that criminal conduct involves . . . an act or omission, the
accompanying circumstances, and the result. The important basic insight of the
Code's framers is that the requisite mental element for a criminal offense must, in the
interest of clear analysis, be faced separately with respect to each material element of
the offense." Id. (footnote omitted).
193 See id. at 144.
194 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 48, at § 2.02(2)(d).
195 See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for some examples of early
disharmony in the choice of an appropriate negligence standard.
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spread and pervasive.19 6 Herbert Packer is only one of many schol-
ars to condemn the criminalization of nonculpable conduct. He,
however, tentatively theorizes that the introduction of a negligence
standard into strict liability statutes could function as a "halfway
house,""9 7 serving as a way of balancing the legislative need for clear
deterrence of conduct endangering public safety against at least the
theoretic issue of culpability raised in the objective terms of a reason-
able man's conduct. By raising at least the issue of an objective stan-
dard of culpability, Packer hypothesizes, the "tyranny of strict
liability" can be avoided.' There would be a theoretic "blamewor-
thiness" in the actor's deviation from the generally accepted stan-
dard of conduct, and the actor's conviction could "serve the
corrective function of promoting future awareness."' 99  Packer
seems tentatively willing in his analysis to "occasionally" sacrifice a
subjectively non-blamewor:hy individual to promote the greater
good of "future awareness." 2 °  Compared to Holmes, however,
Packer was not nearly as convinced of the utilitarian necessity of such
a sacrifice. 20 1 Holmes appeared certain that "justice to the individ-
ual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests [of preventing harm]
on the other side of the scales."20 2 Holmes believed that the proper
196 See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 111-12 (1970) ("[S]trict liability to imprisonment.. . 'has been held by
many to be incompatible with the basic requirements of our Anglo-American ...
jurisprudence' .. . . [T]here is something very odd and offensive in punishing people
for admittedly faultless conduct .. " (quoting Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 70));
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1968) (asserting that "strict
liability is odious, and appears as a sacrifice of a valued principle [in that] . . .those
whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities . . . for
doing what the law requires and abstaining from what if forbids"); Packer, supra note
6, at 109 ("[T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor's state ofmind is both
inefficacious and unjust .... It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma
of a criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy.").
197 See Packer, supra note 6, at 109-10 (citing G. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at
271).
198 See id. at 110.
199 Id. at 144; see also Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept
of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 390 (1966) ("The diligence doctrine is one
important way in which a balance can be struck between the demands of society for
increased protection and the requirement that the criminal law not encroach unjustly
upon the liberty of the individual.").
200 In fairness to Packer, he recommends the use of a negligence standard to
impose criminal liability only on "occasion ... [and] not as a matter of course."
Packer, supra note 6, at 144-45.
201 See supra note I and accompanying quotation by Holmes.
202 0. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 48.
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function of the criminal law was to "sacrifice[] the individual to the
general good" when necessary.2 °3
Packer, on the other hand, notes that to punish conduct without
clear reference to an actor's state of mind "is both inefficacious and
unjust" and will not deter others from behaving similarly in the
future.
20 4
The traditional justifications for imposing criminal sanctions
have tended to fall under four rationales: rehabilitation, incapacita-
tion, deterrence and retribution.20 A broad in terrorem application of
the Clean Water Act's criminal sanctions may inject a degree of fear
into most individual corporate decision making, thereby creating
general wholesale deterrence of all conduct that might conceivably
impact upon water pollution.20 6 Other traditional sanctioning ratio-
nales, however, may not apply in the corporate context of the officer
who makes "good faith" economic decisions regarding plant, equip-
ment or procedures that prove, after analyzing an industrial accident
with the benefits of hindsight, to be ill-advised.
This Comment does not suggest that the federal courts, in inter-
preting the Clean Water Act to require an ordinary tort negligence
standard, necessarily make rigid Holmesian utilitarian sacrifices of
individual liberty interests.20 7 Rather, the courts seem to have fol-
lowed a traditional strict liability notion of lowering the level of
203 Id. The legal theories of Holmes as scholar are not always consonant with
his pronouncements as judge. In United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922),
one of a triad of cases that established the foundations of strict liability criminal law
in the United States, the majority determined that a doctor's sale of drugs without
proof of scienter constituted a criminal offense, holding that "[i]f the offense be a
statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment
need not charge such knowledge or intent." Id. at 288. The Court considered
irrelevant the defendant's good-faith belief that his conduct in dispensing narcotics
was in keeping with his professional medical standards. See id.
In vehement dissent, Justice Holmes noted that since the "defendant was a
licensed physician and his part in the sale was the giving of prescriptions. ., it must
be assumed that he gave them in the ... course of his practice and in good faith ....
It seems to me impossible to construe the statute as tacitly making such acts, however
foolish, crimes." Id. at 290 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Perhaps the implicit distinction
here for Holmes was that he saw no general deterrence value or "general good" to
be gained from the conviction of a physician who may have been acting in good faith
in prescribing the drugs.
204 Packer, supra note 6, at 109.
205 See Note, supra note 2, at 1231.
206 See, e.g., Sethi & Katz, The Expanding Scope of Personal Criminal Liability of
Corporate Executives-Some Implications of United States v. Park, 32 FooD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 544, 546-47 (1977) (arguing that the scope of liability created by Park has
introduced "a new element of uncertainty" into corporate decision making).
207 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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proof to allow for efficient prosecution when "culpability is likely to
be present and yet may be difficult to prove." 20 8 Severe due process
problems are inherent in such a tradition, however, because the gov-
ernment cannot rationally define the very standard through which
the existence of guilt is determined (strict liability) by reference to a
priori assumptions regarding the likelihood of that guilt (that is, that
the defendant probably is culpable, but this culpability is shielded
from proof).
The federal courts should heed the thrust of Packer's argument
that, if a criminal sanction is to result in effective general deterrence,
it must be predicated on a carefully articulated objective standard of
culpability specifically addressing the individual situation of the
actor.20 9 The borrowing of tort law's ordinary negligence standard
does not squarely address the issue of criminal culpability since the
tort standard evolved primarily to serve the interests of restitution
and general deterrence. °2 1 0 In contrast, utilization of the Code's neg-
ligence standard,2 11 with or without its requirement of a gross devia-
tion from a standard of care, would assist the trier of fact in a careful
and deliberate assessment of each of the elements of a negligence
charge.2 12 While the language of the Code establishes culpability
through an objective standard, it is attentive to the issue of the justi-
fiability of the risk taken. 21 3 Most importantly, it asks the trier of fact
to weigh the actor's failure to perceive a given risk in light of the
purpose for which the risk was taken and the circumstances actually
known to the actor. Such criteria invite a marriage of the objective
standard to the subjective context of the actor. They squarely
address the issue of individual culpability in failing to meet a norma-
tive standard (the culpable "absence of a state of mind").2 t4 In terms
of the negligence standard of the Clean Water Act, the use of the
Code's paradigm can assist the jury's analysis by replacing the intui-
tive standard of ordinary tort negligence with the analytic rationality
of the Code, thus requiring a more deliberate, systematic analysis of
208 Abrams, supra note 4, at 473.
209 See Packer, supra note 6, at 109. Packer asserted that "[no] one should be
sentenced to imprisonment... without being afforded the opportunity to litigate the
issue of mens rea or, to use the term adopted by the framers of the Model Penal Code,
culpability." Id. at 150-51.
210 See Fletcher, supra note 172, at 243-45.
211 See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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both conduct and attribution.2" 5 This analysis cannot occur, how-
ever, without an equally logical analysis of what constitutes "respon-
sibility" under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
III. THE "RESPONSIBLE" OFFICER AND THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
The "responsible corporate officer doctrine" evolved in a series
of cases involving violations of strict liability statutes. This section
seeks to show that the Supreme Court has avoided developing any
careful definition of the "responsibility" concept. Therefore, the
term is surprisingly free to be utilized in a number of situations. Fur-
thermore, the borrowing and insertion of the term "responsible" as
the modifier for corporate officers in § 1319(c)(6)2 16 of the Clean
Water Act tends only to compound and exaggerate the uncertainties
of the corporate officer responsibility concept in relation to the Act's
negligence standard.
A. Background: Sanctioning the Corporation or the Individual?
The imposition of criminal sanctions on corporate officers with-
out reference to mens rea arose in significant part because of the
need to find an effective way to deter corporate conduct deemed
harmful to public safety, health and welfare. Since the corporation
cannot be incarcerated and its only identity as a "person" is as an
economic entity, it is immune from the full weight of criminal sanc-
tions.2 7 Accordingly, there is some reason to believe that the cor-
poration's managers will be more responsive to the threat of
sanctions that involve the possibility of personal incarceration.
The "Chicago School" of thought favors focusing criminal sanc-
tions on the corporate entity itself. If the fines are sufficiently sub-
stantial, the theory holds, the corporation will take whatever
corrective action is necessary to monitor personnel behavior, since
its only motive for existence is one of monetary maximization." 
8
This theory asserts that the firm is in a far better position to detect
the misconduct of its employees than are governmental enforcement
agencies.
2 19
This theory is limited, however, by the fact that if the fine is set
high enough to be a substantial deterrent, it can damage the financial
215 See G. FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 511-12.
216 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
217 See Coffee, supra note 154, at 390.
218 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 234-36 (2d ed. 1977).
219 See Coffee, supra note 154, at 408.
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well-being of those who have no say in the policy-making of the cor-
poration: shareholders, blue collar employees and, often, the depen-
dent surrounding community.2 20 Consequently, there is almost
universal agreement that the level of criminal fines currently
imposed upon corporations (limited, as they are, by the above con-
cerns) tends to have minimal impact. 22' As one commentator states,
the imposition of fines results in nothing more than "a reasonable
license fee" to pollute.222
Perhaps in response to the apparent impotence of criminal sanc-
tions as a deterrent force against corporate conduct, Congress has
increased the use of federal statutes223 that impose direct criminal
liability on corporate officers in order to regulate corporate conduct
that may result in harm to the public welfare. Some of these statutes
stipulate no scienter or mens rea element, subjecting corporate offi-
cials to strict liability224 for acts or omissions in which they had a
"responsible share,"22 5 but no direct participation or knowledge.226
In contrast, other statutes provide for criminal sanctions only when
there has been a "knowing violation," thereby substantially increas-
ing the arduousness of the prosecution's burden of proof.2 2 7 The
Clean Water Act, of course, offers yet a third alternative, defining a
220 See id,
221 See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963)
(noting that an executive in a pollution case testified: "It is cheaper to pay claims than
it is to control fluorides."), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964); Comment, supra note
100, at 62-63 n.9 ("[C]riminal fines are frequently an impotent and unjust method of
dealing with corporate polluters."); Comment, Increasing Community Control over that
Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 293 (1961) (stating
the real formulators of corporate policy have little to fear from criminal corporate
fines because the fines are insubstantial).
222 Comment, supra note 221, at 287.
223 For a discussion of the increasing reliance on the "deterrent effect of
criminal punishment to shape corporate action," see Note, supra note 2, at 1229.
224 While there is some dispute as what the term "strict liability" means, see
Abrams, supra note 4, at 463 n.3, this Comment equates the term with those statutes
that criminally proscribe conduct without reference to the element of scienter. See,
e.g., Wholesome Meat Inspection Act § 406, 21 U.S.C. § 676 (1982) (criminalizing
distribution of adulterated meats without a knowledge requirement); Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act §§ 31-33, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (1982) (criminalizing a variety of
acts involving adulterated food, drugs, or cosmetics, such as delivery or misbranding,
without requiring knowledge).
225 See infra notes 245-56 for an analysis of the Supreme Court's "responsible
share" doctrine.
226 See Brickey, supra note 4, at 1343.
227 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
580, 90 Stat. 2811 (1976) (making it a crime for any person knowingly to transport
hazardous waste to a facility without a permit) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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negligence standard of culpability that lies somewhere along the con-
tinuum between strictly liable and knowing violations.
228
B. The Evolution of Strict Liability in the Corporate Context
Conventional mens rea, which requires that the actor must be
aware of the factors making his conduct criminal, places an excep-
tionally heavy burden on the judicial system. 229 Thus, the higher the
general societal need for deterrence of a specific harm, the greater
the reluctance of the legislature may be to impose this burden. This
reluctance was first formally addressed by the Supreme Court in
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v Minnesota.230 In this early twentieth century
case, a company was convicted for cutting timber in violation of a
statute that included incarceration as a sanction. 23 ' The defendant
corporation pleaded that conviction under this statute, which elimi-
nated intent as an element of the offense, violated the fourteenth
amendment. 23 2 The Court, without explanation or reliance on prior
law, rejected the contention that a constitutional protection exists
against the imposition of criminal sanctions without proof of mens
rea. It asserted quite vaguely that "[t]he Constitution declares the
principle upon which the public welfare is to be promoted, and
opposing ones cannot be substituted. ' 23 ' The Court seemed to fear
that a constitutional due process review of state legislation would
detract from the states' capacity to define and establish remedies for
the "public welfare."
234
The next step in the Court's embrace of strict liability came in
United States v. Balint,23 5 which sustained an indictment for violation
of a statute prohibiting the sale of drugs. The Court sustained the
indictment despite the defendants' claim that the absence of the ele-
ment of scienter from the statute violated their due process rights.23 6
228 See 33 U.S.C § 1319(c)(1)(1982 & Supp. 1987).
229 See Packer, supra note 6, at 109.
230 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
231 See id. at 62 & n.1.
232 See id. at 67.
233 Id. at 68 (citing Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 558 (1902),
overruled, Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940)).
234 "If the principle gets its life or its protection from the Fourteenth
Amendment it cannot be destroyed by the legislature upon any conception of the
public welfare." Id. Interestingly, the Court was addressing the issue in the same era
in which Holmes was asserting his utilitarian philosophy. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
235 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
236 See id. at 254.
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Perhaps the Court did not have the opportunity to review fully the
issues, since it rendered the decision after an ex parte proceeding in
which the defense presented no oral argument.2 37 Whatever the rea-
son, the Court peremptorily dismissed the due process argument as
being settled by Shevlin-Carp enter:
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime...
there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecu-
tions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by
such a requirement.... Many instances of this are to be found in
regulatory measures [for the] achievement of some social better-
ment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases ofmala in
se.
2 3 8
The Balint Court used Shevlin-Carpenter to avoid any substantive
discussion of constitutional issues. It also relied on a clear trend in
state law favoring the utilization of strict liability statutes, as if the
presence of such a large volume of state court approved statutes
demonstrated that no constitutional issue could be at stake.
2 39
Implicit in the above quotation from Balint is the concept that
the statute's strict liability focus is on "social betterment" rather than
on punishment. Indeed, the precise nature of the line of strict liabil-
ity cases to which the Court granted certiorari assured that the issue
of incarceration would not be addressed. 24 0 The problem with this
approach, however, is that the possibility of incarceration is sub-
sumed in the overall validation of strict liability criminal sanctions.
C. The "Responsible" Corporate Officer and Strict Liability
United States v. Dotterweich24 1 finally brought the issue of strict
criminal liability to bear upon the role of the corporate officer. Dot-
terweich was the president and manager of a pharmaceutical com-
pany that violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by
shipping misbranded products, an offense for which scienter was not
237 See Packer, supra note 6, at 113.
238 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52.
239 See id. at 252.
240 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 62 (1910), dealt with the
sanctioning of the corporate entity only. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254, dealt solely with the
framing of an indictment. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 666 (1975), involved a
defendant who had been sentenced simply to pay a fine of fifty dollars on each count.
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943), dealt with a conviction
resulting in a fine and a sentence of probation.
241 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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an element.2 42 Despite the fact that the company was not the prod-
ucts' manufacturer and only repackaged them without knowledge of
their alteration,243 the Court found the president criminally liable:
Whether an accused shares responsibility in the business process
resulting in unlawful distribution depends on the evidence pro-
duced at the trial .... The offense is committed.., by all who do
have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction
which the statute outlaws .... Hardship there doubtless may be
under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though con-
sciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative
hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have
at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of con-
ditions .... 244
The Dotterweich Court simply melds the two issues of strict liabil-
ity and vicarious liability into one;2 45 if the trier of fact finds that the
actor had a "responsible share" in the transaction, the actor is held
strictly liable. Moreover, only the trier of fact can determine what
constitutes this criminalizing "responsible share." "In such mat-
ters," the Court asserted, "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise
guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment ofjuries must be
trusted. Our system of criminal justice necessarily depends on 'con-
science and circumspection in prosecuting officers .... ,246 This
analysis, however, disregards the judiciary's role. As the dissenters
vehemently noted, the United States' system of law is predicated on
legislative or judicial definitions of crimes, not prosecutorial discre-
tion.247 Without some clear legislative standard of responsibility and
judicial interpretation of that standard, one runs the risk under the
242 See id. at 278-81. For two contrasting analyses of the scope of "strict"
liability for "responsible" corporate officials under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, see supra note 4.
243 One of the two counts involved the repackaging of a shipment of digitalis
that had been received from a wholesaler. The violation occurred because the drug
was not the precise strength for which it was labelled, though admittedly there was no
way short of conducting a chemical analysis for the company to verified the strength.
See Packer, supra note 6, at 116.
244 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85 (emphasis added).
245 See Packer, supra note 6, at 117-18. Packer considered this blurring of the
two separate elements to be one of the dilemmas making careful analysis of the
"responsible share" concept so difficult today. See id.
246 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
380 (1913)).
247 See id. at 292-93 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that such a
situation is "precisely what our constitutional system sought to avoid." Id. at 292
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Dotterweich standard that the jury alone may determine not just the
facts, but the actual scope of criminal liability.
Implied in the concept of "responsible share" in Dotterweich is an
allegation of negligent conduct; that is, the officer was in a position
of control and, since a violation occurred, the officer presumably
failed in his duty to prevent that violation.24 8 One must wonder
whether the introduction of the "responsible share" concept was
simply a way of defining the scope of liability or whether, quite unin-
tentionally, it began to define an intuitive standard of culpability
itself.
24 9
In United States v. Park,2 50 the Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction of the president of a large food chain as "responsible" for a
violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In this case, rodent
excreta had contaminated warehouse food supplies.251 The Fourth
Circuit, in reversing the conviction, held that the government had to
prove "wrongful action" by the president in its charge that he had a
"responsible share." 25 2 The Supreme Court responded that, while it
was true that "responsible share" imported some "measure of
blameworthiness," the government only need prove that the defend-
ant had, "by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or to correct
promptly, the violation... and failed to do so." 253 Here, the Court's
words reflect precisely the words used to define liability for ordinary
negligence: the officer had an affirmative duty of care and failed to
fulfill that duty.
25 4
In his dissent in Park, Justice Stewart immediately noted that the
jury hearing the case was riot afforded the benefit of this careful
"negligence" analysis that defined the scope of the defendant's
248 See Abrams, supra note 4, at 466. Of course, such an allegation is not
articulated by the Court. Nevertheless, the prosecutor, the judge and the jury all may
sense that they are dealing with culpability, even though it need not be proved under
a strict liability statute.
249 Cf id. (noting "how short a step it is from the responsible share formula to a
culpability standard").
250 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
251 See id. at 660.
252 United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 841-42 (1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
253 Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74 (emphasis added).
254 The Park decision did narrow the reach of the "responsible share doctrine"
as articulated in Dotterweich. Dotterweich appeared to define the "responsible share" in
respect to the titular status of the officer, whereas Park examines the officer's
relationship to the violation itself. See Note, Individual Liability of Agents for Corporate
Crimes Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 31 VAND. L. REv. 965, 987 (1978).
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"responsible share" liability.2 5 As a consequence, Justice Stewart
feared that a jury could convict the corporate officer purely on the
basis of his status, since the trial court had not instructed the jury that
there must be a failure of a defined duty of care.
256
Park articulates the proposition that a corporate officer's respon-
sibility, with the attendant duty of "the highest standard of foresight
and vigilance" that it imposes, does not create criminal liability if the
defendant can show as a defense either that he was "'powerless' to
prevent or correct the violation," or that it was "objectively impossi-
ble" for him to prevent the violation.257 The potential effectiveness
of this defense is illusory, however, because proof of absolute
"impossibility" is, so to speak, impossible. 258 As a last resort, the
government can always assert that the corporation could have shut
down and avoided risk altogether.25 0
D. Due Process Judicial Review
Despite Holmes' professed willingness to sacrifice the individual
to achieve effective general deterrence, 260 the fifth amendment man-
dates that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law." 26' The Court during most of this century,
however, has ignored the strength of this phrasing, developing an
unusual "allergy" when confronted by substantive due process
255 See Park, 421 U.S. at 678-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
256 See id. at 679 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The trial judge concluded that, under
Dotterweich, the definition of "responsible relationship" was a question for the jury,
not the court. The trial judge disagreed with such lack of definition of an element of
the offense, but he adhered to it anyway. See id. at 680 n. 1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 673.
258 At least, cases following Park that have raised this defense have met with no
success. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir.
1976) (conviction of corporation and its president affirmed despite defense of
"objective impossibility" that installation of preventive device was barred by inability
to obtain construction materials), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v.
Starr, 535 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1976) (conviction of corporation and its secretary
treasurer affirmed in that it was not objectively impossible using the "highest
standard of foresight" to have foreseen that the plowing of a nearby field would
result in a "natural phenomenon" of rodents fleeing for shelter from the field to the
warehouse).
259 See, e.g., . Hata, 535 F.2d at 511 (noting the prosecution's argument that the
"objective impossibility" defense "applies only when the officer was in fact powerless
to prevent or correct the violation, even by suspending the corporation's food
warehousing activity if necessary").
260 See supra note I and accompanying text.
261 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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issues.2 6 2 In the origins of its strict liability interpretation, the Court
expressed its reluctance to interfere with legislatures' design of crim-
inal sanctions.263 In response, one commentator has termed this
action "a blind attempt to tow the substantive-procedural line [in
which] the judiciary frequently has unduly compromised its own
sense of justice while, ironically, trying to preserve what amounts to
nothing more than a conceptually indefensible theory of judicial
review."
264
The problem with utilizing the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to establish judicial review of legislatively-designed criminal sanc-
tions is the extraordinarily amorphous nature of the term "due pro-
cess." While appearing to embody a number of protected legal
rights, "due process" has no definitive meaning. Indeed, Justice
Black expressed the fear that the term could be used to justify judi-
cial fishing expeditions into the legislative domain based on nothing
more than vague notions of "natural justice": "[I] do not believe
that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause ... to measure
constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable . . . or is offensive to our notions of 'civilized stan-
dards of conduct.' "265
Consistent with such substantive due process fears, the Supreme
Court's review of legislatively-enacted criminal sanctions has been
limited to the lenient "rational basis" standard. Herbert Packer
notes that if this is the limit of the Court's inquiry, then nothing has
been asked, since even a statute requiring the boiling in oil of an
offender could be considered a "rational" means to achieve the end
of effective deterrence.
2 66
262 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (White, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962). Justice White noted that "[ilf this case involved
economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due process would
surely save the statute and prevent the Court from imposing its own philosophical
predilections upon state legislatures or Congress." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
263 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
264 Dubin, supra note 201, at 371.
265 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
266 Packer comments:
[T]he traditional inquiry of substantive due process is: is there any
rational basis (however wrong-headed we may think it) for what the
legislature has done? [The inquiry does] not ask the question inherent in
the eighth amendment: is what the legislature has done, however
rationally supportable it may be, too offensive to stomach? There is
nothing irrational about boiling people in oil; a slow and painful death
may be thought more of a deterrent to crime than a quick and painless
one. The constitutional objection that would surely prevail is based on
decency.
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Given the limited scope accorded substantive due process, the
Court intentionally deprives itself of the tools necessary to deter-
mine the minimal due process requirements for liberty deprivations
under criminal statutes. It is one of the continuing misfortunes in
the evolution of strict liability cases through Dotterweich and Park that
the absence of the incarceration issue has allowed the Court to
finesse due process concerns.2 6 7 The Clean Water Act itself may
provide an opportunity for the Court to address this issue, if it so
chooses. The intensity of public concern over environmental pollu-
tion well may result in a trial court sentencing a corporate officer in
the near future to a substantial jail term for negligent violation of the
Act.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the "public welfare" issue of environmental
pollution is unquestioned; there is an urgent need to vehemently
confront the situation without equivocation.268 This Comment
addresses the issue of achieving maximum deterrence on industries'
managers without compromising the due process principles of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to bal-
ance perceived individual liberty interests against legislatively
defined public welfare needs as the scope of public welfare offenses
Packer, supra note 95, at 1076.
267 See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text. Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952), is perhaps the most quoted of all the public welfare cases, but
the rigor of its analysis lacks as much as its predecessors. JusticeJackson, writing for
the Court, articulates a relatively safe judicial realm for the public welfare offense:
The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to
prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no
more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
Justice Jackson's analysis implies that one's sense ofjustice is not offended when
the sanctions imposed are minimal. His analysis leaves unanswered the question of
whether the term "relatively small" includes the use of some finite amount of incar-
ceration for strict liability offenses. Obviously, the term "relatively small" inures to
the eye of the beholder. For corporate officers, thirty days in jail is likely to be a very
long time.
268 See, e.g., High Cost of Deteriorating Environment Is Charted, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1989, at A4, col. 1 (citing a Worldwatch Institute report asserting that "[t]he world
can expect widespread economic decline and social disruption in the 1990's unless
national leaders make a serious commitment to reverse the deterioration of the
earth's environmental systems").
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gradually evolved. 269 The development of strict liability case law is
thus a "house built on sand," since the Supreme Court cases that
laid the foundations for strict criminal liability refrained from analyz-
ing the mens rea element in relationship to the fifth amendment safe-
guards for deprivation-of-liberty.270
The extended reach given strict liability by Dotterweich and
Park 27 1 to include all those with a "responsible share" in the occur-
rence compounds this problem. This attenuated interpretation of
criminal liability weakens an already careless and "intellectually
unsatisfying" Court analysis. 27 2 The decision to allow a jury to
determine responsibility as an issue of fact without clearly defined
guidance from the trial court serves only to undermine further the
already weak judicial foundations for liability.
Congress' introduction, however, of at least a nominal mens rea
element into the Clean Water Act's criminal sanctions2 73 (as
opposed to the Refuse Ac:'s strict liability provisions274 ) initially
seemed a positive step towards addressing the due process issue of
liberty deprivation. Its negligence standard required at least a mini-
mal assessment of a defendant's "absence of a reasonable state of
mind," in that the individual must culpably fail to perceive what a
reasonable person would have perceived. 275 The use ofjury instruc-
tions in the language of ordinary tort negligence, however, under-
mines this objective standard. This ordinary negligence approach
fails to provide the jury with the analytic tools needed to properly
assess the culpable scope of the defendant's alleged deviation from a
reasonable standard of care.
27 6
Furthermore, the introduction of the words "responsible corpo-
rate officer," 277 as borrowed from the strict liability conceptualiza-
tions of Dotterweich and Park, circularly allows the assessment of
negligence in strict liability terms. As the Park Court defines the
term, if the officer is found to be "responsible" in the context of a
269 See supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text for an outline of the
broadened scope of public welfare offenses in this century.
270 See supra notes 55-69 & 269 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
absence of the issue of incarceration.
271 See supra notes 242-60 and accompanying text.
272 Packer, supra note 6, at 152.
273 See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text for a review of the Model
Penal Code's criminal negligence standard.
276 See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 243-261 and accompanying text.
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violation, in a sense he is per se negligent. The assessment of role or
status readily becomes confused with the assessment of the criminal
culpability of negligence.
278
Given these considerations, the introduction of a negligence
standard into the Clean Water Act has not cured the strict liability ills
of the Refuse Act. Rather, the ills have spread through the conduit
of the "responsible share" doctrine into the judicial interpretations
of the Clean Water Act. Both Congress and the Court need to
reconceptualize the definition of "responsible share" to remedy this
problem. They must establish standards for the determination of any
fact concerning "responsible share." Without such a standard, the
implementation of the Act's criminal sanctions requires the jury, in
determining the scope of the officer's "responsibility," to determine
issues that are substantially matters of law.
2 79
Finally, trial courts must discontinue the use of a tort ordinary
negligence jury instruction for the assessment of criminal culpability
under the Clean Water Act. The tort standard was not designed to
assess criminal culpability, and is thus an extremely crude analytical
tool when used to that end.280
In contrast, the Model Penal Code's negligence standard,28
even omitting its "gross deviation" requirement, provides for a pre-
cise analysis of an individual's culpable failure to perceive a given
risk, as measured against a carefully-articulated, normative stan-
dard. 282 As the Supreme Court recently repeated in Liparota v.
United States:
"The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil."
2 83
In Liparota, the Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Bren-
nan, reversed the conviction of a store owner for statutory violations
in acquiring food stamps. 284 These violations raised the mens rea
issue outside the domain of ninety years of the Court's muddied
278 See supra notes 250-61 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
283 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
284 See id. at 423.
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interpretation of public welfare law. Considering the Court's capac-
ity to become mute on the issue in the public welfare context, this
may have been a fortuitous result. The unequivocal strength of the
Court's words, however, offers no restrictions or exceptions: A
"mature system of law" will assess the individual's capacity "to
choose between good and evil." This Comment urges that the Clean
Water Act's usage of a tort ordinary negligence jury instruction, cou-
pled with the "responsible share" doctrine, does not allow, as pres-
ently implemented, for a precise assessment regarding that "choice."
Regardless of the extent of public need for protection from
environmental harms, the judicial criminal process is not excused
from an accurate assessment of culpability for convictions that may
result in the loss of a defendant's liberty. The due process mandate
of the fifth amendment exist for all; they are not waived simply
because of public welfare needs. Justice Rutledge accentuated this
point in his dissent in In re Yamashita. 85 In this case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the death sentence of a Japanese general for the
atrocities of his troops without proof that the general had-knowledge
of these acts. Justice Rutledge warned:
Nor has any human being heretofore been held to be wholly
beyond elementary procedural protection by the Fifth Amend-
ment. I cannot consent to even implied departure from that great
absolute.
It was a great patriot who said: "He that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if
he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself.
' 28 6
285 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (RutledgeJ., dissenting).
286 Id. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945)).
